304

PAGE 01 BAGHDA 01581 101633Z 9606

ACTION NEA-11

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INFO | OCT-01 | ADS-00 | INR-10 | EUR-12 | SS-15 | CIAE-00 | EA-10 |
| | DODE-00 | H-01 | IO-15 | NSCE-00 | ARA-16 | NSAE-00 | SSO-00 |
| | SY-05 | HA-06 | TRSE-00 | PM-05 | PA-01 | OCT-02 | INRE-00 |
| | SAL-01 | ICAE-00 | SYE-00 | SP-02 | SPRS-02 | /119 W | |

266344 101640Z /52

O P 101026Z JUN 81
FM USINT BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1916
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIER PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSLES PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY
COMIDEASTFOR PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 1581

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/10/87 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, IS, IZ
SUBJ: FURTHER IRAQI REACTION TO THE ISRAELI RAID

1. (CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WITH LIMITED LOCAL CONTACTS, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR DIPLOMATS IN BAGHDAD TO MONITOR PUBLIC OPINION HERE. HOWEVER, SEVERAL NON-POLITICAL IRAQIS HAVE EXPRESSED TO US SURPRISE AT THE STRENGTH OF POPULAR REACTION TO THE RAID WHICH THEY DESCRIBE AS HAVING UNITED THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND CREATED A FEELING OF DEEP BITTERNESS AGAINST ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A NATURAL ASSOCIATION IN MOST ARAB MINDS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES, IRAQI IRE HAS APPARENTLY NOT BEEN TRANSFERRED TO US TO THE EXTENT WE THOUGHT LIKELY. OUR OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, WHICH HAVE BEEN PUBLICIZED BY THE VOICE OF AMERICA, BBC, AND NOW CARRIED BY THE IRAQI PRESS, HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD.

3. THE OFFICIAL IRAQI LINE REMAINS STEADY AND CALM WITH NO ATTACKS THUS FAR ON THE U.S. WORLD-WIDE CONDEMNATIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN HEAVY PUBLICITY AND PROBABLY HELP LESSEN THE NEED FOR THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP TO "DO SOMETHING." ALL CHIEFS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAVE BEEN CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, INDIVIDUALLY OR IN REGIONAL GROUPS, TO BE GIVEN A SOLEMN VERSION

BAGHDA 01581 101633Z

OF IRAQI CONCERN. THEY HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONDEMN THE ISRAELI RAID, BUT SO FAR AS WE KNOW, THERE HAS BEEN NO REQUEST FOR THEM TO JOIN IN ANY SPECIFIC SANCTIONS.

4. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING WHICH WILL GET UNDERWAY JUNE 11 WILL, AMONG OTHER THINGS, DISCUSS SECURITY COUNCIL TACTICS AND DECIDE HOW FAR THEY WISH TO GO IN PRESSING FOR PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL, AS OPPOSED TO A SIMPLE CONDEMNATION.

5. MANY IRAQIS PROBABLY HOPE THAT SOMEHOW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ISRAELI RAID A PRETEXT CAN BE FOUND BY IRAQI AND IRANIAN LEADERS TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES QUICKLY AND TURN AGAINST A COMMON ENEMY. HOWEVER, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC BRIEFINGS CONTINUES TO LINK THE ISRAELI RAID WITH IRAN, AND WE NOTE THAT TEHRAN IS LINKING THE ISRAELIS WITH SADDAM AND THE U.S. ALTHOUGH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WOULD LIKE TO END THE WAR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN THEIR PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THEY MUST GUARD AGAINST A POPULAR BACKING AWAY FROM THE STRUGGLE AGAINST "THE PERSIAN ENEMY."

6. MANY OBSERVERS IN BAGHDAD BELIEVE ISRAEL MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN ACKNOWLEDGING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RAID SINCE THIS HAS MOBILIZED IRAQI, ARAB AND WORLD OPINION IN A WAY THAT A MORE AMBIGUOUS ISRAELI HANDLING OF THE SITUATION WOULD NOT HAVE DONE. EAGLETON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY J.L. DATE 9/30/82
XDS☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED☒ RELEASABLE☒
RELEASE DENIED☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

DECLASSIFIED